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STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
DISPOSITION OF LAND IN ALASKA:
A PROPOSED REMEDY FOR THE
INADEQUACIES IN THE CURRENT
CASE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1977, the Alaska Supreme Court has decided four cases
evaluating the standing of the taxpayers and citizens of Alaska to
bring suit challenging the disposition of Alaska lands by state or local
officials.I The court granted the plaintiff standing to sue in three cases,
and denied the plaintiff standing to sue in one. The defendant in each
case was the Alaska governmental official or body responsible for the
challenged land disposition. Taken together these four cases are con-
fusing and difficult to reconcile. This note examines the four cases and
the basis of the taxpayer's and citizen's standing to sue. The note con-
cludes by recommending a single, clear doctrine controlling the stand-
ing of Alaska's taxpayers and citizens to challenge the governmental
disposition of land in Alaska.
II. BACKGROUND OF STANDING TO SUE IN ALASKA
Standing to sue is a jurisdictional doctrine used to determine
whether a party is sufficiently affected by a controversy to have it de-
cided by the courts. 2 Before a court may hear and decide a dispute, it
must determine that the plaintiff has standing to bring the suit in that
court. The trend in both federal and state courts in recent years has
been to move away from a restrictive and exclusionary approach to
standing and toward a policy of increased accessibility to judicial fo-
rums.3 This liberal trend is evident in decisions of the Alaska courts,
which have interpreted standing broadly to favor such increased
accessibility.4
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1. The four cases are: Hoblit v. Comm'r of Natural Resources, 678 P.2d 1337
(Alaska 1984); Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204 (Alaska), appeal dismissed, 464
U.S. 801 (1983); Gilman v. Martin, 662 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1983); State v. Lewis, 559
P.2d 630 (Alaska), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 901 (1977).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1260 (5th ed. 1979).
3. Coghill v. Boucher, 511 P.2d 1297, 1303 (Alaska 1973).
4. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 23 (Alaska 1976).
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
To have standing to sue in Alaska courts, the plaintiff must have
a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.5 This stake is evi-
denced by an injury-in-fact.6 The Alaska Supreme Court has noted
that "[w]hile the injury-in-fact requirement has been relaxed, it has
not been abandoned, as it is necessary to assure the adversity which is
fundamental to judicial proceedings. However, the degree of injury
need not be great."'7
The federal standing to sue doctrine arises from the requirement
set forth in article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution that
a "case or controversy" exist before federal courts are empowered to
decide a case. This constitutional provision has been interpreted to
mean that the suit must be presented "in an adversary context and in a
form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution."8 Because
article III, section 2 does not apply to state courts, and because the
Alaska Constitution has no similar language, the Alaska standing re-
quirements are essentially only court-created rules of judicial self-re-
straint.9 Only Alaska precedent controls the Alaska doctrine of
standing to sue.
In accordance with their liberal approach to standing questions in
general, Alaska courts have broadly construed the standing require-
ments for taxpayers and citizens challenging the disposition of Alaska
land.10 This approach has increased the number of Alaska citizens
who can attack state and local administrative actions disposing of state
property.11 Increased accessibility to judicial forums is a laudable pol-
icy objective. Problems exist in the pursuit of this objective, however,
because the Alaska cases interpreting standing in the taxpayer and
citizen suits regarding the disposition of land have not been consistent
with each other. Furthermore, the cases have failed to clearly articu-
late a workable standard with which to evaluate standing
controversies.
5. Id.
6. Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975).
7. Id. (footnote omitted). See Sisters of Providence, Inc. v. Dep't of Health &
Social Serv., 648 P.2d 970, 974 (Alaska 1982); Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices
Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469, 474 (Alaska 1977); City of Homer v. Dep't of Natural Re-
sources, 566 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Alaska 1977).
8. Falcon, 570 P.2d at 475 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968)).
9. Id. See Sisters of Providence, 648 P.2d at 974; Moore, 553 P.2d at 24 n.25
(noting that standing to sue in Alaska is a judicial rule of self-restraint which avoids
abstract questions and advisory opinions).
10. Wickersham v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 680 P.2d 1135, 1139
(Alaska 1984).
11. See Coghill, 511 P.2d at 1303.
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III. THE STATE V. LEWIS TEST OF TAXPAYER
AND CITIZEN STANDING
The leading case in Alaska on the standing of taxpayers and citi-
zens to bring suit challenging the disposition of land is State v. Lewis. 12
Lewis resulted from a breakdown in the land selection process set forth
in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA") enacted in
1971.13 Pursuant to ANCSA, Alaska Natives formed corporations
and received rights to select lands in Alaska and to share in the sale of
minerals from those lands. This procedure worked well with all the
Native corporations except for Cook Inlet Region, Inc. ("Cook"). 14
In an attempt to resolve the Cook difficulties, Alaska agreed to trans-
fer land to the United States in order to augment the holdings from
which Cook could select. Several Alaska taxpayers, who were not
members of the Cook corporation, brought an action against the state,
challenging the validity of this three-way exchange of land. 15 An
Alaska superior court held that the special state statute authorizing
Alaska's transfer of land to the United States was unconstitutional and
enjoined the transaction. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed and
held that the special statute was constitutional. 16
In Lewis, the Alaska Supreme Court examined for the first time
the issue of "whether a taxpayer without a direct financial stake in a
particular government expenditure or a citizen who suffers no eco-
nomic loss has standing to vindicate the public interest."'17 While the
court noted that the suit resembled a typical taxpayer or citizen suit in
many respects, it chose not to decide whether to extend its "liberal
interpretation. . to permit standing in all such suits."'1 8 The court
held "only that under the particular facts involved here," the plaintiffs
had a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to guarantee the adver-
12. 559 P.2d 630 (Alaska), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 901 (1977).
13. 43 U.S.C. § 1601-28 (1982).
14. Lewis, 559 P.2d at 633. Cook had severe difficulties completing its land selec-
tions because of previous federal land withdrawals from Alaska, state land selections,
and non-Native land settlement patterns. The other eleven regional Native corpora-
tions managed to avoid these problems with their land selections.
The United States Department of the Interior, Alaska, and Cook reached an
agreement in an attempt to resolve Cook's difficulties. This agreement is entitled
"Terms and Conditions for Land Consolidation and Management in the Cook Inlet
Area." Id. at n.5. It is set out in H.R. REP. No. 729, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35, re-
printed in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2376, 2402.
15. Lewis, 559 P.2d at 632-34.
16. Id. at 633-34. This special legislative act is entitled An Act Relating to the
Cook Inlet Land Exchange; and Providing for an Effective Date, ch. 19, 1976 Alaska
Sess. Laws 1.
17. 559 P.2d at 634 (footnote omitted).
18. Id. at 634-35.
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sity fundamental to judicial proceedings.' 9
Alaska courts had not previously been confronted with the exact
standing question at issue in Lewis. The Alaska cases cited in Lewis
were background cases articulating Alaska's general standing policy20
and the need for an injury-in-fact. 21 The court seemed to base its deci-
sion entirely upon federal case law22 and selected legal commentary.
23
The court based its conclusion that the plaintiffs had standing to sue
on four factors:24
1. The plaintiffs alleged violations of two specific state constitu-
tional limitations (on mineral alienation and special legislation);2 5
2. The transaction involved an enormous amount of land and its
potential economic impact on the state treasury was vast;
26
3. The plaintiffs alleged injury beyond economic injury (the loss of
"mineral resources in land originally selected from the federal gov-
19. Id.
20. Id. at 634, n.7.
21. Id. at 635, n.10.
22. Id. at 634 nn. 8-9, 635 & n.14. The court cited and briefly discussed: Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
23. Lewis, 559 P.2d at 634 n.8, 635 n.13. The court cited and briefly discussed: 3
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.09 (1958), §§ 22.09-. 10 (Supp.
1965); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Standing]; Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1961); Comment, Taxpayers'Suits: A Survey and Sunmary, 69
YALE L.J. 895 (1970).
24. Lewis, 559 P.2d at 635.
25. Id. Those specific violations are the restraints on the alienation of mineral
resources in ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 9, and restrictions on local and special legis-
lation in ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 19.
Art. VIII, § 9. Sales and Grants. Subject to the provisions of this section,
the legislature may provide for the sale or grant of state lands, or interests
therein, and establish sales procedures. All sales or grants shall contain such
reservations to the State of all resources as may be required by Congress or
the State and shall provide for access to these resources. Reservation of ac-
cess shall not unnecessarily impair the owner's use, prevent the control of
trespass, or preclude compensation for damages.
Art. I1 § 19. Local or Special Acts. The legislature shall pass no local or
special act if a general act can be made applicable. Whether a general act
can be made applicable shall be subject to judicial determination. Local acts
necessitating appropriations by a political subdivision may not become effec-
tive unless approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon in
the subdivision affected.
26. Lewis, 559 P.2d at 635. The court did not estimate how great the economic
injury to the state treasury might be if the challenged transaction was permitted. The
land conveyed by Alaska to the United States in the Lewis transaction appears to be in
excess of 470,000 acres. H.R. REP. No. 729, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-50, reprinted in
1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2376, 2415-17.
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ernment under the Statehood Act");2 7 and
4. There was no one in a better position to complain than the
plaintiffs.28
Because of "the totality of the circumstances" in Lewis and "the
strong policy favoring review of alleged specific constitutional viola-
tions by state officials," the court held that it could appropriately
reach the merits of the controversy and granted the plaintiffs standing
to sue.29
The Lewis court chose not to make its decision applicable to all
taxpayer and citizen suits.30 Later decisions, however, have applied
the Lewis factors to taxpayer and citizen suits with different factual
situations than Lewis. Some of these decisions are arguably inconsis-
tent with Lewis. In order to correctly apply the Lewis factors to later
controversies with dissimilar facts, it is important to first understand
the legal doctrine upon which Lewis is based.
In Lewis, the Alaska Supreme Court relied heavily on the United
States Supreme Court decision in Flast v. Cohen.31 In Flast, the
Supreme Court modified the former principle that a federal taxpayer
had no standing to challenge the legality of a federal expenditure. 32
The Court decided that "Taxpayers have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of federal expenditures under 'specific clauses' of the
Constitution, and the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment are 'specific clauses.' ",33 Unfortunately, the Court
did not state which, if any, other clauses the Court would regard as
specific. 34 The Court held that alleged violations of specific constitu-
tional limitations frame the issues with specificity and adverseness, are
pursued with vigor, and therefore are appropriate for judicial
resolution.35
The Lewis decision also relied on the reasoning of Professor Ken-
neth Culp Davis. Davis's view, adopted in United States v. Students
27. Lewis, 559 P.2d at 635. How this injury is distinct from economic injury is
not clear, but it may relate to Alaska's political influence and self-reliance. The court
states that it is "inclined to recognize that harm to nontraditional and intangible inter-
ests may be sufficient to create an 'injury-in-fact,'" id., and cites Standing, supra note
23, for the proposition that an "identifiable trifle" is the basis for standing to fight out
a question of principle. Lewis, 559 P.2d at 635, n.13.
28. Id. at 635.
29. Id. at 636 (emphasis added).
30. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
31. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
32. This principle was established by Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487
(1923). See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:23-:24 (2d ed. 1983).
33. 4 DAvIs, supra note 32, § 24:24 at 299 (discussing Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-04).
34. 4 DAvis, supra note 32, § 24:24 at 300.
35. Flast, 392 U.S. at 106.
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Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 36 a case cited by
the Alaska Supreme Court in Lewis, is that "an identifiable trifle is
enough for standing to fight out a question of principle: the trifle is the
basis for standing and the principle supplies the motivation. '37 Ac-
cording to Davis, it is clear under federal law "that standing may rest
upon a trifle, and it is equally clear that at least a trifling interest of the
plaintiff is always required."' 38 The Lewis opinion cited three other
federal cases39 in which the Supreme Court denied standing for want
of the trifling interest.4° Davis's trifling interest language had been
quoted in at least one earlier Alaska Supreme Court decision. 4'
The Lewis court does not identify the specific constitutional limi-
tations that might satisfy the first of the four crucial standing require-
ments it enunciated. The Flast decision is likewise of little assistance
to courts attempting to identify such limitations. 42 Flast stated that
constitutional limitations affecting taxing and spending by the United
States government are specific restrictions, but did not delineate other
sufficiently specific restrictions.43 Lewis clearly goes beyond Flast by
holding that a constitutional limitation is a specific restriction if it di-
rectly restricts the disposal of mineral resources affecting the state's
revenue, or directly restricts the authority of the state government to
enact special legislation. Yet the precise nature of a "specific constitu-
tional limitation" remains unclear.
The second and third Lewis requirements for standing demand
that the plaintiff allege that he has suffered or will suffer some objec-
tive injuries from the challenged action. The alleged objective injuries
suffered by the taxpayers and citizens in Lewis are difficult if not im-
possible to measure, and seem to be no more than mere "trifling" in-
terests under Davis's terminology. They are remote and speculative.
The magnitude of the land transaction may be enormous, and it may
cause losses to the state treasury over several years, but the cost to one
36. 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973); see supra note 22.
37. Standing, supra note 23, at 613; see 4 DAVIS, supra note 32, § 24:18 at 283.
This view is also quoted in Lewis, 559 P.2d at 635 n.13.
38. Standing, supra note 23, at 613.
39. 559 P.2d at 635 & n.14. The cases the court cited are: Schlesinger v. Reserv-
ists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
40. See 4 DAVIS, supra note 32, at § 24:19. Richardson and Reservists clearly hold
that if a plaintiff is to have standing, he must have suffered an injury, and a contro-
versy without an injury is insufficient. Id. § 24:20 at 288. "[T]he attenuated character
of the particular impact on the plaintiff should be relevant but not conclusive against
jurisdiction." Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 255, 304 (1961).
41. See Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 n.7 (Alaska 1975).
42. See, eg., 4 DAVIS, supra note 32, at § 24:24.
43. 392 U.S. at 105-06.
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individual taxpayer and citizen in Alaska is likely to be insignificant.
The individual plaintiff's noneconomic interest in having the state re-
tain mineral rights is likewise insubstantial. The harm alleged by the
plaintiffs is of small value when spread among all taxpayers and citi-
zens in Alaska. But there is, nonetheless, some harm alleged. The
court thus seemed to endorse the Davis view that a trifling injury sup-
ports standing to sue.
The fourth standing factor in Lewis - that no one is in a better
position than the plaintiff to bring suit - was not adopted from the
federal case law or the legal commentary that Lewis examined. This
factor was introduced in an earlier Alaska standing case, which arose
"in a slightly different context." 44 This factor is attenuated in impor-
tance by the court's own recognition that "the requisite injury cannot
be created by the absence of a more appropriate plaintiff.' '45 Never-
theless, the lack of a more appropriate plaintiff remains a factor that
Alaska courts must consider under Lewis.
In summary, the Lewis court decided that a taxpayer and citizen
has standing to sue the state or local government when certain factors
are present. The first factor is that the plaintiff must allege two viola-
tions of specific state constitutional limitations. The second and third
factors require that injuries-in-fact be sustained by the plaintiff. These
injuries need not be certain. The Lewis court was satisfied with specu-
lative economic interests coupled with an interest in protecting the
state from an allegedly unwise transaction. The fourth factor requires
that no one be in a better position than the plaintiff to bring the action.
Since Lewis did not rule on all taxpayer and citizen actions, the
presence of all four factors may not always be required. The court
decided that the particular facts of Lewis mandated standing; it did not
hold that standing would be denied in other less compelling factual
situations. A case whose facts present less than all four factors may
therefore also compel the court to grant a particular plaintiff standing
to sue.
4 6
44. Lewis, 559 P.2d at 635 (citing K & L Distrib., Inc. v. Murkowski, 486 P.2d
351, 354 (Alaska 1971) (holding that a distributor has standing as a competitor to
challenge a tax credit given to a brewery where taxpayer and citizen status was not
alleged)).
45. Id.
46. At this point it is important to note that taxpayer and citizen suits to chal-
lenge land dispositions may possibly arise under the Alaska Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"), ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.010-.650 (1959). The fact that a suit is brought
under the APA will not affect this note's analysis.
The APA provides that "An interested person may get a judicial declaration on
the validity of a regulation by bringing an action for declaratory relief in the superior
court." Id. § 44.62.300 (emphasis added). A regulation is limited to a "rule, regula-
tion, order, or standard of general application . . . adopted by a state agency to




A. Carpenter v. Hammond
In the 1983 decision of Carpenter v. Hammond,47 the Alaska
Supreme Court elaborated on State v. Lewis. 4 8 Carpenter involved a
challenge to the 1981 reapportionment of the Cordova, Alaska, elec-
toral district, with Governor Hammond named as the defendant. 49
The plaintiff was a resident of Anchorage who alleged that his status
as a registered voter gave him standing to challenge the reapportion-
ment under article VI, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution.50 The
supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that Carpenter's status
as a registered voter did in fact give him standing, 51 but added that he
also had standing as a taxpayer and citizen under the Lewis factors.52
The court held that Lewis stressed the following factors: two al-
leged violations of specific constitutional provisions, the land transac-
tion's significant impact on the state treasury, and the lack of anyone
in a better position than the plaintiff to litigate the complaint. 53 In
Carpenter, however, there was only one alleged violation of a constitu-
tional provision. 54 The only alleged injury to the plaintiff mentioned
in the opinion was that the disputed drawing of election district lines
§ 44.62.640(a)(3) (1970). An interested person is not defined but has been interpreted
to require otherwise normal standing requirements. Sisters of Providence, 648 P.2d at
974 ("We have recognized the right of interested [persons] to challenge administrative
decisions where the party demonstrates a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy."); Coghill, 511 P.2d at 1303-04. A state agency is defined as an "or-
ganizational unit of the executive branch." ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.640(a)(4) (1970).
The jurisdiction of the superior court to make a declaratory judgment is limited
to the "case of an actual controversy within the state." Id. § 22.10.020(b) (1980). The
requirement of an actual case or controversy in actions seeking declaratory relief does
not differ from the standards applicable in other civil actions. Jefferson v. Asplund,
458 P.2d 995, 999-1000 (Alaska 1969).
The analysis for standing, therefore, is the same regardless of whether the suit is
brought under the APA. In actuality, the APA has not been used frequently to bring
pure taxpayer and citizen suits - probably because of its limited substantive applica-
bility. The Alaska cases discussed in this note do not arise under the APA.
47. 667 P.2d 1204 (Alaska), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 801 (1983).
48. 559 P.2d 630 (Alaska), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 901 (1977).
49. 667 P.2d at 1205, 1208.
50. Id. at 1208-09. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 11 states: "Any qualified voter
may apply to the superior court to compel the governor. . . to correct any error in
redistricting or reapportionment."
51. Carpenter, 667 P.2d at 1209.
52. Id. at 1210.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1208. The allegation was that the Cordova district's reapportionment
violated ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6, which permits the governor to redistrict voting
areas subject to the limitation that each district be a "continguous and compact terri-
tory containing as nearly as practicable a relatively integrated socio-economic area.
. . . Application must be filed within thirty days."
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"arguably will have a significant impact on the state."55 Finally, the
court held that no one was in a better position than the plaintiff to
litigate the issues presented because no one else brought suit within the
thirty-day period allowed by Alaska's Constitution.5 6
It was unnecessary for the supreme court in Carpenter to discuss
the Lewis factors after it recognized plaintiff's standing as a registered
voter under article VI, section 11. Its interpretation of Lewis is thus
only dictum, but it does shed light upon the Lewis standing factors.
The court apparently determined that "specific constitutional limita-
tions" include a constitutional restriction on the governor's authority,
even if that restriction is completely unrelated to the state treasury.
Also, under Carpenter the allegation of a single specific constitutional
limitation will apparently satisfy the first Lewis requirement. With re-
spect to the second and third Lewis factors, the court apparently rea-
soned that an "arguable" effect on the state (truly only a trifling
interest) could be a sufficient injury-in-fact on which to ground stand-
ing, even though that effect is speculative and not economic. As for
the fourth Lewis factor, the court apparently viewed the time to con-
sider whether anyone is in a better position to complain than the plain-
tiff as being the time at which the case is decided, rather than the time
at which the injury occurred. There were certainly persons in a better
position than the plaintiff to challenge the reapportionment within the
thirty-day period, had any of them cared to do soY The lack of an-
other timely challenge apparently creates a strong presumption that
the plaintiff is in the best position to sue. This presumption further
undermines the Lewis approach by lessening the significance of the
fourth factor as a barrier to standing.
B. Gilman v. Martin
The Alaska Supreme Court did not discuss Lewis in its 1983 deci-
sion of Gilman v. Martin.58 In Gilman, residents of the Kenai Penin-
sula Borough challenged the validity of a borough land sale lottery
ordinance involving 825 acres.59 The ordinance required applicants to
be residents of Kenai for at least one year before they became eligible
to participate in the land sale lottery.6° Martin, a member of the Ke-
nai Assembly, filed suit against the borough of Kenai and Gilman, its
mayor. Martin later added two plaintiffs who were new residents of
55. 667 P.2d at 1210.
56. Id. at 1210, n.13; see ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6.
57. The plaintiff lived in Anchorage, which is a great distance from Cordova.
Residents of Cordova were more closely affected by the improper districting and were,
therefore, in a better position to challenge it.
58. 662 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1983).
59. Id. at 123.
60. Id. at 121.
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Kenai and thus ineligible to participate in the lottery. The plaintiffs
alleged that the ordinance violated the equal protection clauses of both
the United States and Alaska Constitutions.61 The superior court held
the ordinance unconstitutional and the supreme court affirmed in
part.62
The supreme court held that the standing of the two additional
plaintiffs was "obvious" since they were directly prevented from par-
ticipating in the land lottery. 63 The court then held that Martin had
standing as a taxpayer and citizen. 64 The court held, without examin-
ing or citing any authorities, that:
Any resident or taxpayer of a municipality has a sufficient interest
in the disposition of a significant number of acres of the municipal-
ity's land to seek a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the
disposition. Thus, as a resident and taxpayer of Kenai, Martin has
a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of this controversy to as-
sure the adversity that is fundamental to judicial proceedings. 65
The court did not define significant, but apparently 825 acres qualified
as significant within the context of Gilman.
While Lewis was expressly not made controlling of all taxpayer
and citizen suits against the government - thus allowing less compel-
ling factual situations to warrant standing- Gilman's radical lowering
of the standing threshold requires some analysis and discussion of pre-
cedent and authority, and not just an unexplained blanket assertion.
Gilman should have addressed the Lewis analysis, especially since the
Carpenter decision, which determined standing according to the Lewis
factors, was decided by the supreme court during the same year as
Gilman.
In Gilman, the supreme court strayed even farther from the Lewis
rationale than it did in Carpenter. In fact, Gilman completely under-
mines the Lewis decision. The Lewis transaction involved 470,000
acres.66 The interest each taxpayer and citizen in Alaska has in
470,000 acres is certainly much greater than the interest each taxpayer
and citizen in Kenai has in 825 acres.67 The Lewis decision's analysis
of complicated factors would have been unnecessary if Gilman had
61. Id. at 122. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); ALASKA CONST.
art. I, § 1 ("all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and pro-
tection under the law").
62. The supreme court agreed that the statute was unconstitutional as a violation
of equal protection, but found no violation of the Alaska gambling statute. Gilman,
662 P.2d at 121-22.
63. Id. at 123.
64. Id.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. See supra note 26.
67. See infra note 81.
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been the controlling law, for the Gilman court undertook no analysis
at all. After Gilman it is unclear whether a taxpayer or citizen chal-
lenging the disposition of Alaska land must allege violations of specific
constitutional limitations, suffer injury, and be in the best position to
challenge the government action, or must only allege the disposition of
a "significant" amount of Alaska land.68
C. Hoblit v. Commissioner of Natural Resources
In the 1984 decision of Hoblit v. Commissioner of Natural Re-
sources,69 the Alaska Supreme Court denied a taxpayer and citizen
standing to challenge a state administrative decision to sell land ad-
joining his on Ismailof Island. 70 Hoblit's neighbor had applied for a
preference right to purchase the disputed land. Alaska's Commis-
sioner of Natural Resources approved the application and then gave
public notice of the preference right and a deadline for any objections
in the Homer News on four different dates.71 The Commissioner reex-
amined the preference right following Hoblit's objection and con-
cluded that it was properly granted. Hoblit then sued to challenge the
decision and alleged standing as a taxpayer, a representative of the
public interest, and a property owner.72 The superior court dismissed
the suit for a lack of standing.73 The supreme court affirmed the denial
of Hoblit's standing as a taxpayer but remanded for an inquiry to de-
termine whether the possibility of future trespasses on Hoblit's land
might qualify as an injury-in-fact, which would warrant standing.74
The supreme court in Hoblit examined Lewis, Carpenter, and
68. Under the Lewis factors the plaintiffs in Gilman would have had no standing
to sue. The only alleged violation of a constitutional limitation in Gilman was that the
lottery was a violation of the equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Alaska Constitu-
tions. In contrast to the alleged violations of constitutional limitations in Lewis and
Carpenter, see supra notes 25, 42, 43, & 54 and accompanying text, the equal protec-
tion clause is a relatively unspecific limitation. It does not directly proscribe any par-
ticular authority of the state government or its agencies and subdivisions.
Furthermore, while Martin may have sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact in the litiga-
tion simply by being a resident of the municipality that was improperly attempting to
dispose of its land, there were, unquestionably, persons in a better position than Mar-
tin to challenge the lottery. Two others with "obvious" standing joined Martin as
plaintiffs in the same action. See Gilman, 662 P.2d at 123.
69. 678 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1984).
70. Id. at 1338, 1341 (Hoblit lived on Ismailof Island, which is near Homer in the
Kachemak Bay, off the Kenai Peninsula).
71. Id. at 1338. The Commissioner of Natural Resources may give a preference
right to purchase or lease land from the state, under ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.035(b)(3)
(1984), to any person who has made improvements in the land but has been denied
title to it through error or omission of others.
72. 678 P.2d at 1339.
73. Id. at 1339-40.
74. Id. at 1341-42.
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Gilman before deciding to deny Hoblit standing as a taxpayer. The
court distinguished Lewis by stating that Hoblit did not allege a trans-
action of the size or with the potential economic impact of the transac-
tion involved in Lewis.7 5 The court did not distinguish Carpenter and
did not explain why Carpenter had standing as a taxpayer and citizen
when he did not allege a transaction anywhere near the magnitude of
that in Lewis or any potential economic impact. The court distin-
guished Gilman by declining to reduce the meaning of a "significant
number of acres" from 825 to twenty.76 The Hoblit decision, however,
is inconsistent with the Lewis, Carpenter, and Gilman decisions, and
the supreme court should have granted Hoblit standing to sue.
Hoblit had standing under the Lewis and Carpenter tests. Hoblit
alleged two violations of constitutional limitations, although these are
not mentioned in the supreme court's decision. He alleged that the
Commissioner did not give proper notice of the preference right,
thereby violating article VIII, section 10 of the Alaska Constitution,
which provides for such notice when state lands are leased or dis-
posed.77 Hoblit also alleged a violation of article VIII, section 17 of
the Alaska Constitution, which prohibits disposal of land through per-
sonal favoritism. 78 The latter allegation may not qualify as a specific
constitutional limitation because it is an indirect restriction, but the
first allegation seems to involve a specific constitutional limitation. It
prevents the Commissioner of Natural Resources and the Alaska Divi-
sion of Land from disposing of lands except under certain procedures
75. Id. at 1341.
76. Hoblit, 678 P.2d at 1341. In Hoblit the supreme court leaves open two diffi-
cult questions: What number of acres between twenty and 825 is significant? To
whom must the land be significant - the state, the plaintiff, or the defendant?
77. Reply to Appellee's Brief at 9, 10, 17-18, Hoblit, 678 P.2d 1337 (1984).
ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 10 states: "Public Notice. No disposal or leases of state
lands, or interests therein, shall be made without prior public notice. . . as may be
required by law." ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.945(b) states:
Notice. . . shall be given at least thirty days before the action by publica-
tion in newspapers. . . of general circulation in the vicinity of the proposed
action and . . . posting in a conspicuous location in the vicinity of the ac-
tion, notification of parties known or likely to be affected by the action, or
another method calculated to reach affected persons.
Hoblit alleged that Ismailof Island is remote and that there is no newspaper of
general circulation in the area. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.945(b) (1984) applied through
art. VIII, § 10 thus required notice of the preference right to be posted.
78. Hoblit, 678 P.2d 1337; Appellee's Brief at 35, n.17, Hoblit; Reply to Appel-
lee's Brief at 18, Hoblit.
The constitutional provision that Hoblit alleged had been violated, ALASKA
CONST. art. VIII, § 17 states: "Uniform Application. Laws and regulations gov-
erning the use or disposal of natural resources shall apply equally to all persons simi-
larly situated. .. ."
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specified by law.79 Hoblit alleged at least the same number of viola-
tions of specific constitutional limitations as the plaintiffs alleged in
Carpenter and arguably the same number as the plaintiffs in Lewis
alleged.
Hoblit also alleged an injury-in-fact of more than triffing propor-
tions. As a land owner on a small, isolated island, he was alarmed by
the disposal of neighboring land in a seemingly improper manner. He
was alarmed by a change in the state's easements on the land, which
he claimed would result in trespassing upon his property.80 Hoblit's
alleged injury-in-fact is at least as great as the injuries alleged by the
plaintiffs in Carpenter and Lewis.
Hoblit also satisfied the final Carpenter and Lewis requirement,
and thus had standing under the rationale of those two cases. There
was no one in a better position to sue than Hoblit. As in Carpenter, no
one else brought suit before the objection period expired. Also, there
are only a few residents of Ismailof Island, none of whom were in a
better position to complain than Hoblit, whose property adjoined the
disputed land.
Hoblit also had standing under the Gilman test. Hoblit's interest
in the disposition of twenty acres of land on a small, sparsely popu-
lated island is much greater than Martin's interest in 825 acres of the
Kenai Peninsula in Gilman. 81 Hoblit clearly alleged at least as great
an injury as the plaintiff in Gilman. The court should have granted
Hoblit standing to sue as a taxpayer and citizen challenging the dispo-
sition of state land.
V. A SIMPLE SOLUTION TO THE CONFUSION CREATED
BY THE CASE LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court decisions in State v. Lewis, 82 Carpen-
79. See United States Smelting, Refining, and Mining Co. v. Local Boundary
Comm'n., 489 P.2d 140, 143 (Alaska 1971) (holding that while some types of public
policy questions are beyond the court, others, "such as whether statutory notice re-
quirements were followed, are readily decided by traditional judicial techniques").
80. 678 P.2d at 1341.
81. In 1980 Kenai Peninsula Borough's population was 4326, while Alaska's was
400,142. COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE 223 (Rand-McNally Co.
112th ed. 1981). The 825 acres in Gilman divided by Kenai's 4326 residents equals an
interest of less than 0.20 acres per resident of Kenai. The 470,000 acres in Lewis
divided by 400,142 persons equals an interest of almost 1.2 acres per citizen of Alaska.
In contrast, Hamilton Cove on Ismailof Island had only fifteen residents in 1980.
COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE 223 (Rand-McNally Co. 112th ed.
1981). Twenty acres divided by 15 persons equals an interest of 1.33 acres per person.
Certainly Hoblit's interest, on a person per acre basis, is greater than that of the plain-
tiffs in either Gilman or Lewis.
82. 559 P.2d 630 (Alaska), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 901 (1977).
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ter v. Hammond, 83 Gilman v. Martin,8 4 and Hoblit v. Commissioner of
Natural Resources 8 5 confuse the law and do not stand well together.
Neither the courts nor the Alaska taxpayer and citizen can determine
from these four cases what is required to establish standing to chal-
lenge a state disposition of land.
The Lewis standing factors are fraught with problems. First,
Lewis only compels standing when all of the factors are present. It is
unclear whether less compelling fact situations will also provide stand-
ing, as Carpenter suggests, and, if so, how compelling such situations
need to be. Second, the Lewis court did not provide a standard for
determining what constitutional provisions are "specific." "Specific
constitutional limitations" appears only to be a term of art applied to
an occasional constitutional provision. Third, what constitutes an in-
jury-in-fact is not clear, and Alaska courts have held that remote, un-
certain, and speculative injuries are sometimes sufficient. An
argument can be made that none of the plaintiffs in Lewis, Carpenter,
Gilman, or Hoblit had any traditional injury-in-fact. Finally, the time
at which a plaintiff should be deemed to be in the best position to sue
is not defined and often seems glossed over.
The Gilman test completely undermines Lewis. Gilman compels
standing when the plaintiff alleges the governmental disposition of a
"significant" amount of land. Gilman invites endless debate and un-
certainty about what amount of land is "significant," and about the
size of the community in which the significance is evaluated. Inevita-
bly, "significant" will be defined by some arbitrary cut-off point, deny-
ing standing to some plaintiffs and granting it to others who challenge
only marginally larger land dispositions. If the Gilman approach is
accepted, the Lewis factor test may be completely unnecessary. On the
other hand, perhaps the Gilman court meant for the Lewis test to ap-
ply when plaintiffs do not allege the disposition of a "significant"
amount of land.
The Alaska Supreme Court should clear up the uncertainties in
the law of taxpayer and citizen standing to challenge the disposition of
land in Alaska. Since the tests used in Lewis, Carpenter, Gilman, and
Hoblit are problematic, the best solution would be to completely aban-
don all formalistic tests. The Alaska Supreme Court should adopt the
position that taxpayers and citizens always have standing to challenge
governmental land dispositions. Any test for injury or standing is
eliminated. This simple solution would not require the supreme court
to overrule precedent. This solution merely serves to extend the scope
of standing conferred by the prior cases.
83. 667 P.2d 1204 (Alaska), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 801 (1983).
84. 662 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1983).
85. 678 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1984).
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Support for the elimination of all standing requirements in the
limited context of challenges to state land dispositions can be found in
the work of Professor Kenneth E. Scott. Scott has advocated the elim-
ination of all tests for standing in general. 86 His idea is that litigation
delays and the commitment of time and resources erect an initial
screening barrier of considerable height. Before bringing suit, the
plaintiffs must feel strongly enough about the issues to pay these costs.
These high costs cut down the amount of litigation and provide a
guarantee of the plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy. If there were no personal involvement or adverseness, the
plaintiff would not engage in the costly pursuit of litigation.87 As Pro-
fessor Scott observed, "The idle and whimsical plaintiff, . . . who liti-
gates for a lark, is a specter which haunts the legal literature, not the
courtroom. ' 88 Professor Scott's position provides a simple, automatic
measure of sufficient interest - the willingness of the plaintiff to sue.
Difficult questions of specific constitutional limitations, injuries-in-
fact, and "significant" amounts of land are eliminated.8 9
Access screening is, moreover, a job for which the judiciary is ill-
suited. A judge has no ready way to estimate a person's grievance,
especially when it is not economic. 90 Professor Scott's suggestion
completely removes the problem of estimating the relative magnitude
of injuries to people with different personal values.91 Support for the
Scott position is further seen in that some states already automatically
allow standing in taxpayer and citizen actions in a variety of circum-
stances. 92 Since Alaska courts already grant standing to plaintiffs with
questionable injuries-in-fact, the adoption of Professor Scott's sugges-
tion in the context of state land dispositions would not be a drastic
change and would save lawyers and the judiciary time and energy. 93
86. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court - A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 645, 645-92 (1973). This view is acknowledged in 4 DAVIS, supra note 32 at
§ 24:6, :24 (noting that courts often decide questions without an adversary context,
such as consent decrees, pleas of guilty, enforcement of subpoenas unresisted, volun-
tary petitions in bankruptcy, etc.), and in Comment, supra note 23, at 913 (attorney
fees and costs sufficiently deter harassment suits).
87. Scott, supra note 86, at 673-74.
88. Id. at 674.
89. See id. at 677.
90. Id. at 682.
91. Id. at 692.
92. See 4 DAVIS, supra note 32, at § 24:6, :10 (discussion of public actions that
are allowed in New York for nonfiscal matters, and in New Jersey, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, South Dakota, Nebraska, New Mexico, California, and Kentucky); Jaffe,
supra note 23, at 1279 (discussion of nonfiscal New York public action cases); St. Clair
v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 77-81, 192 N.E.2d 15, 16-19, 242 N.Y.S.2d
43, 45-49 (1963) (cited in Lewis) (recommending allowance of all public actions in
New York).




By eliminating all tests of standing for Alaska taxpayers and citi-
zens to bring suit challenging the disposition of Alaska lands, the
Alaska Supreme Court can end the confusion created in the last eight
years by four irreconcilable cases. The costs and time commitments
associated with litigation against the Alaska government erect a law-
suit screening barrier of a height sufficient to thwart frivolous chal-
lenges. There have been few challenges to Alaska land dispositions in
the past. Eliminating the conflicting standing requirements that now
exist probably will not increase litigation of cases involving the state's
disposition of land. The new approach will, however, eliminate the
potential for unfair and arbitrary decisions regarding access to judicial
forums and will clear up a confused area of the law.
Michael C. Castellon
est is a sufficient injury-in-fact to allow a plaintiff standing to litigate. See supra notes
43-44 and accompanying text. The Carpenter decision moved beyond this position
and held that an "arguable" impact on the state would be a sufficient injury-in-fact to
support the plaintiff's standing. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Gilman
moved yet further by presuming, without discussion, that a resident of a municipality
has a sufficient interest in a "significant" amount of land to constitute an injury-in-
fact. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. These three cases show a definite
trend of the Alaska Supreme Court away from requiring certain, traditional injuries-
in-fact to support standing and toward allowing all plaintiffs standing to challenge the
disposition of state lands.
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